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Since 1962, the "Five Year Force Structure and Financial Pro-
gram" has provided the Secretary of Defense with a means for effect-
ing organized direction and control over the peacetime activities
of the uniformed services. Prior to the advent of this instrument,
proposed programs did not have to be so comprehensively and pre-
cisely defined and they did not have to be costed in minute detail
to be included in the President's Budget. While this situation
undoubtedly left much to be desired in terms of today's more sophis-
ticated management practices, the services enjoyed relative flexi-
bility in executing their programs. When unanticipated emergencies
developed for which monies had not been specifically provided, they
could usually be financed by "savings" made in executing programs
or by diverting funds from lower priority programs which were either
eliminated or curtailed. In those instances when the requirement
for funds was significant, supplemental appropriations could be
requested of Congress. Today, unanticipated emergencies continue
to be financed in essentially the same manner, but since the esti-
mates are much more precise, the "savings" from executed programs
are usually of a much smaller magnitude, if they exist at all.
Because of this situation and the frequency with which emergencies
such as Berlin, Cuba and Vietnam have occurred during the past
three years, there has been concern expressed by many persons that
the "Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program" is not ade-
quate for dealing with similar eruptions that are bound to occur in
the future. These persons contend that since the instrument is
structured to manage peacetime activities, it is too rigid to cope
with wars of any magnitude. They further contend that if the
instrument is to be used for dealing with limited wars, then a
separate program should be established for that purpose. Under-
lying these contentions is the belief that if a separate program
is established there will be a better opportunity for obtaining
resources greater than those now provided. The purpose of this thesis
is to examine these contentions.
An analysis of the "Five Year Force Structure and Financial
Program" and the major events included in the budgeting process
reveals that a separate program for limited war, in itself, will
not assist the Army in obtaining additional resources. On the
contrary, since there is no meaningful basis for determining forces
required only for limited war, reductions might be made by higher
authorities if forces so designated are overstated. In any event,
the designation of separate forces for limited war could impair
the Army's flexibility in responding to other threats.
Tliis thesis concludes by stating that a separate program should
not be established for limited war and that whenever it is necessary
to focus attention on limited war requirements, this objective can

be achieved by specifically identifying pertinent activities within







The election of the late President John F. Kennedy and the
appointment of Mr. Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense Led
to significant changes in the budgetary practices of the military
services. Upon taking office in January L961 the President instructed
the Secretary of Defense to:
L. Develop the force structure necessary to our military
forces without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings; and,
2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possibLe
cost
.
In dealing with this formidable task, the Secretary of Defense
in conjunction with his Comptroller, Mr. Charles J. Hitch, developed
2
a decisionmaking process based upon the concept set forth in a book
which the comptroller coauthored prior to his appointment. Funda-
mentally, this process focuses upon detailed cost estimates and
provides for military alternatives to be evaluated in terms of
their economic characteristics. The end product of this decision-
making process is identified officially as the "Five Year Force
Structure and Financial Program."
US Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Defense
Appropriations for 1963 , 87th Congress, 2nd Session, 1962, p. 4.
^Charles J. Hitch, and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age , Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard
University Press, 1963, p. 422.

THE FIVE YEAR FORCE STRUCTURE AND FINANCIAL PLAN
Tying together the numerous and often heterogeneous forces and
activities of the military services, the "Five Year Force Structure
and Financial Plan" (hereinafter referred to as "The Five Year Pro-
gram") is mission oriented. In this regard, as suggested by their
titles, the individual programs which comprise the "Five Year Pro-
gram" are structured to reflect the purposes and objectives of the
different military forces and to categorize the activities which
3
augment and provide for their support:
Program I - Strategic and Retaliatory Forces
Program II - Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces
Program III - General Purpose Forces
Program IV - Sealift and Airlift Forces
Program V - Reserve and Guard Forces
Program VI - Research and Development
Program VII - General Support
Program IX - Military Assistance
Paramount among its many purposes, the "Five Year Program,"
provides the Secretary of Defense with a means for direction and
control of the peacetime activities of the uniformed services. By
providing a framework for translating plans into specific objectives
and courses of action and by setting forth alternatives which permit
3The Army Program Manual
,
Headquarters, Department of the Army,
Office of the Adjutant General, 17 Jun. 1963, p. 2-1.

a meaningful a L Location of available resources, the "Five Year Pro-
gram" enables L lie Secretary to look at the defense effort as a
whole, to establish priorities in terms of the total program, and
to make timely and effective management decisions which maintain
balance among aLL elements within the military spectrum. Stated
more succinctly and with a different focus, the "Five Year Program"
provides the bridge between military plans and resource allocations.
It serves as a basis for developing the military estimates that are
inc Luded in the President's Budget and for justifying those esti-
4
mates to higher authorities.
To be sure, the "Five Year Program" and the system by which it
is maintained are having a significant impact upon the budgeting
practices of the individual services. In this regard, the writer
has observed that military and civilian personnel alike are being
increasingly challenged by the need to identify and defend proposed
programs in terms of detailed cost estimates and meaningfuL alter-
natives. 'In developing estimates, costs must be projected over a
five year period and be identified in terms of research and develop-
ment, initial investment, and operational requirements. Proposals
which are not adequately supported have littLe chance of being
approved. And, even when proposals are so supported they frequently
are not approved unless they are of sufficient priority to warrant
department of Defense Instructions 7045.1, POD Programming
System




an allocation of the monies that are expected to be made available
for defense. In this regard, the writer believes Army proposals,
in general, are better prepared than ever before; however, unless
they relate to the war in Vietnam or to strategic considerations
they usually are not approved.
CAUSE FOR CONCERN 7
Prior to the advent of the "Five Year Program" proposed pro-
grams did not have to be so comprehensively and precisely defined
and they did not have to be costed in minute detail to be included
in the President's Budget. While this situation undoubtedly left
much to be desired in terms of today's more sophisticated manage-
ment practices, the services enjoyed relative flexibility in
executing their programs. When unanticipated priority requirements
developed, such as emergencies in Lebanon or Laos, for which monies
had not been specifically provided, these requirements could usually
be financed by "savings" made in executing programs or by diverting
funds from lower priority programs which were either eliminated or
curtailed. In those instances when the requirement for funds was
significant, supplemental appropriations could be requested of
Writer's discussions with key personnel at the decisionmaking
level within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 10 Dec. 1965.
'The data included under this heading, except as otherwise
indicated, are the writer's beliefs based upon his experience on
the Army Staff and in the Army Materiel Command during the period
December I960 thru June 1965. The writer also believes that these
data reflect the general concensus of those persons interviewed in
preparing this study.

Congress. Today, unanticipated priority requirements continue to
be financed in essentia L iy the same, manner, but since estimates are
much more precise, the "savings" from executed programs are usually
of a much smaLLer magnitude, if they exist at alL. Because of this
situation and the frequency with which emergencies such as Berlin,
Cuba and Vietnam have occurred during the past three years, there
has been concern expressed by many persons that the "Five Year
Program" is not adequate for dealing with similar eruptions that are
bound to occur in the future. An early expression in this regard
was made by Secretary Hitch:
In the limited war sphere accomplishments have been less
impressive (i.e., in the Five Year Program). We have
made a good deal of progress on some facets of the
general problem - tactical aircraft, non-nuclear air-
craft, munitions, airlift and sealift, among others.
We have also made a good start on the analysis of
requirements for ground forces, Army procurement and
support aircraft. But I would be less than candid if
I did not tell you that we have a long ways to go on
these problems.
While Secretary Hitch's concern was focused essentially on the
work yet to be done in improving the scope and content of the basic
programs which comprise the "Five Year Program," the concern
expressed by certain persons in the Army is substantially different.
These persons contend that since the "Five Year Program" is structured
to manage the peacetime activities of the uniformed services it is
too rigid to cope with wars of any magnitude. They further contend
Q
Charles J. Hitch, "Plans, Programs and Budgets in the Depart
ment of Defense," Operations Research , Jan. -Feb. 1963, pp. 1-17.
5

that if the "Five Year Program" is to be the principal instrument
for dealing with Limited wars, then a separate program should be
established for that purpose. Underlying these contentions is the
belief that if a separate program is established for limited war,
there will be a better opportunity for identifying requirements and
for obtaining resources greater than those now provided.
TOPIC FOR RESEARCH
Since the close of World War II the writer has continuously
engaged in some aspect of military management relating to personnel,
logistics, and financial resources. During this period, he has
performed duties involving programs and budgets within the Army
General Staff at the Department of the Army, and within the head-
quarters of major commands in the United States and in overseas
areas. Because of this experience and an intense interest in the
"Five Year Program," the writer became especially interested in
dealing with the contention that limited war should be programmed
separately. In exploring this matter, his interest was particularly
stimulated by the fact that the contentions were found to be con-
troversial at the highest levels of military management. For these
reasons, the writer concluded that he would examine this contro-
versy by dealing with the research question which is the title of
this study: Should Limited War be Programmed Separately?
In selecting this question and in making the study which
follows, the writer wishes to make it abundantly clear that the
value judgments he expresses are not criticisms of higher authorities

or that he regards himself as possessing the solution to this serious
matter. However, he hopes that by p Lacing the issue in perspective
and by expressing his own conclusions, he may make some contribution
in dealing with the financing of limited war.
DEFINITION OF LIMITED WAR
For the purpose of this study, the term "limited war" is con-
sidered to encompass low and mid-intensity warfare as defined by
the Chief of Staff, United States Army. This definition is reflected
at the beginning of Chapter 2.
SOURCES OF DATA
The data used in making this study were obtained from committee
hearings, reports, and enactments of the United States Congress;
from official records, directives and regulations; and, from other
material dealing with the subject. The principal sources of these
data are reflected in the bibliography. Data were also obtained by
personal interviews with key personnel within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army. For obvious
reasons, it would be inappropriate and infeasible for these persons
to be identified.
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
In the next chapter we shall examine the "Five Year Program"
as it pertains to the Army and determine what would be involved in
estab lishing" a separate program for limited war. Based upon our
7.

findings we shall turn our attention in Chapter 3 to the budget
process and to the Army's basic appropriations. Here we shall set
the framework for examining the probabilities of obtaining greater
resources if Limited war is programmed separately. Finally, in
Chapter 4 we shall analyze the programming controversy and answer
the research question and suggest courses of action which should
lead to an improved capability for financing limited war.

CHAPTER 2
THE FIVE YEAR PROGRAM - ITS SPECIFIC APPLICABILITY TO LIMITED WAR
Before we endeavor to evaLuate the contentions expressed by
proponents on both sides of the controversy as to whether there
should be a separate program for limited war, Let us identify that
portion of the spectrum of warfare which is at issue. In a speech
at Fort BLiss, Texas, on March 22, L965 , General Harold K. Johnson,
Chief of Staff, United States Army cited three types of conflict
and the basic Army missions pertinent to each.
First, nuclear war or high-intensity warfare, which
involves the application of the most modern military
technology in maneuver, firepower (and here I include
nuclear and other advanced weapons), intelligence and
command. As long as the United States, as the most
powerful of the free nations, maintains pre-eminence
in this capability there is no possibility that the
present deterrent to Communist challenge will be
eroded.
Second, conventional war or mid -intensity warfare,
which involves a capability to Eight successfully
for limited objectives under definitive policy
limitations as to the extent of the destructive power
that can be employed or the extent of the geographical
area that might be involved.
Third, stability operations or low-intensity warfare,
which involve actions to establish, regain or maintain
control of land areas threatened by guerrilla action,
revolution, subversion or other tactics aimed at
initial takeover. This mission may require direct
employment of United States combat forces alongside
allied forces or it may require United States advice
Harold K. Johnson, Landpower Missions Unlimited , Speech
delivered at the Civilian Aides Conference, Fort Bliss, Texas,
22 Mar. 1965.

and combat support for allied forces in the form of
individual Army advisors and small supporting units
such as we now are furnishing in Vietnam.
For purposes of this study we shall embrace the spectrum of
warfare described by the Chief of Staff and we shall hold that low-
in_ensity warfare and mid-intensity warfare constitute that portion
of the spectrum which is at issue.
SHARPENING THE CONTROVERSY
Since the "Five Year Program" currently identifies forces,
materiel and facilities for coping with all types of conflict, we
shall sharpen the controversy by determining the included programs
that would have to be modified if a separate program were established
for limited war. In proceeding with this determination we shall
eliminate "Program I - Strategic Retaliatory Forces" and "Program
IX - Military Assistance" from our consideration, since the Army
2
has no programming responsibilities for either of these programs.
And, we shall examine the remaining programs, in turn, based upon
their ascending applicability to limited war. The first program
which merits our attention is Program II.
PROGRAM II - CONTINENTAL AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE FORCES
As suggested by its title, this program encompasses those
forces that are identified with weapon systems, warning and
The Army Program Manual , Headquarters, Department of the Army,
Office of the Adjutant General, 17 Jun. 1963, p. 2-4.
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communication networks, and ancillary equipment that detect,
identify, track and destroy unfriendly forces approaching the
North American Continent. More specifically, this program includes
Civil Defense and those forces that are assigned to Headquarters of
the Army Air Defense Command and its subordinate organizations which
are responsible for operating surface-to-air missile systems such
as the Nike -Hercules and the Missile Master.
Because of their well defined mission, the forces included in
this program are not engaged in any activity that is peculiar to
limited war. For this reason, we shall eliminate this program from
further consideration since it is not pertinent to the controversy
being examined in this study.
PROGRAM IV - AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT FORCES
Of all Army programs, this program has the most limited scope
in that it pertains only to the operation of CONUS and overseas
ports, port facilities and related sub-installations which provide
4for cargo and passenger transshipments. Because of their very
nature, however, the activities included in this program have a
vital role in national defense at all times and they are not sus-
ceptihle to being fragmented for identification with a particular
type of conflict. By recognizing this significant characteristic,
there can be no doubt that this program is not germane to the con-
troversy we are examining.
^
Ibid.





PROGRAM V - RESERVE AND GUARD FORCES
The forces incLuded in this program consist of Army Reserve
and Army National Guard personnel who are not on active duty but
who receive pay for their drill and other training. Fundamentally,
these forces are organized and maintained to provide a reservoir
of trained units and individuals that are available for active duty
in the event of national emergency. While these forces may be
ordered to active duty as they were during the crises in Berlin and
Cuba to deal with limited war situations, their primary missions
are oriented to the air defense of the United States and to conflicts
which have escalated to intensities of general conventional or
nuclear war.
In view of the preceding and because these forces are composed
of individuals whose call to active duty can be effected only by
the President and the Congress, there is sufficient evidence that
these forces are not intended to be used over protracted periods in
pursuing limited wars. Based upon this evidence we shall conclude
that Program V should not be modified to identify any individual or
unit with a separate program for limited war.
PROGRAM VII - GENERAL SUPPORT
The numerous activities which are encompassed in this program
support the entire Army on a world-wide basis. Because of their
Ibid., pp. 2-13, 2-14.
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heterogeneous nature they have been structured Into several broad
categories: individual training and education; intelligence and
security; communications; logistical support; medical services;
command and general support; the Defense Atomic Support Program;
Office of the Secretary 06 Defense support; and, Industrial Funds.
NormaLly these activities are CONUS based or they are centrally
administered.
With very few exceptions, the activities included in this pro-
gram cannot be singularly identified with any type of conflict nor
can they be meaningfully fragmented for that purpose. To illustrate
this situation a brief examination of each broad grouping is
appropriate.
INDIVIDUAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION
Basically, individual training embraces three broad categories:
(1) Basic recruit and replacement training which is conducted at
training centers and stations; (2) career training which emphasizes
military doctrine, strategy and tactics; and (3) special skill train-
ing in fields such as missile maintenance, aircraft mechanics,
electronic equipment repair, financial management, languages, and
the operation of the complex and intricate weapons and equipment
of the modern Army. While part of this training is obtained from
civilian educational institutions, the vast majority is accomplished
6 Ibid., p. 2-45.
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within the Army service schools and colleges that provide resident
instruction.
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
The Army Attache System and the Army activities engaged in
central intelligence and in collecting and disseminating information
for internal and industrial security are covered by this grouping.
Also, this grouping includes the Army's mapping and geodesy activities
which produce and distribute maps, map auxiliaries, geodetic data
Q
and other Engineer intelligence studies.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
The activities included in this grouping may be structured
into three smaller units: (1) those that supply the Army; (2)
those that provide for industrial preparedness; and, (3) those that
overhaul and rebuild the Army's equipment. In the first unit, the
supply management and procurement offices and the supply depots
constitute the supply lifeline to Army forces throughout the world.
Together they catalog and determine the Army's materiel require-
ments, and, in turn, effect their receipt, storage and issue. The
activities in the second unit plan with private industry for pro-
duction during mobilization and they insure that the Army's idle







use when required. The CONUS depot maintenance activities included
in the final unit overhaul, repair and modify equipment, renovate
ammunition, prepare maintenance publications, and furnish technical




The medical and dental care of persons serving on active duty,
their dependents, and other authorized personnel are effected by
the hospitals, clinics, Laboratories and other medical facilities
included in this grouping. When authorized care cannot be provided
within government facilities and treatment is accomplished in
civilian hospitals, the Office for Dependents Medical Care makes
,10appropriate payment.
COMMAND AND GENERAL SUPPORT
The Department of the Army, headquarters of major field
commands, the Alternate Joint Communications Center and MAAGs and
missions are the principal activities which constitute this group.
Lesser activities also inc Luded are disciplinary barracks, recruit-
ing, examining and induction stations (CONUS) and those which engage










DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT PROGRAM
This grouping is limited to the military and civilian personnel
who perform operational and management functions for the Defense
L2Atomic Support Agency.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SUPPORT
This grouping is also limited to personnel who are assigned in
support of joint activities and agencies of the Department of Defense.
Identified as joint activities are organizations such as: Headquarters,
Atlantic Command; Headquarters, SAC Atlantic; Headquarters, Joint Task
Force Eight; Inter-American Defense Board; Brazil Defense Commission;
OSD; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Inter -American
Defense College. The Department of Defense Agencies include the




Army Industrial Funds are revolving funds to provide working
capital at chartered industrial and commercial type activities.
These funds initially finance the production of goods and services
for the three military departments and other government agencies,









Currently Industrial Funds are identified at nine toon commercial
and Industrial typo activities. Four of these activities are depot
maintenance shops which overhaul and repair materiel; two are
laboratories performing research and related tunc t Ions on chemical
and biological agents, and on fuses and intelligence devices; two
are proving grounds testing delivery systems and protective equip-
ment; ton are arsenals performing research and engaging in Limited
quantity manufacturing with respect to guided mlsslLes, artillery,
small arms, ammunition, special weapons, and hazardous biological,
radiological, and chemical materials; and, one Is a pictorial center
producing motion pictures, film strips, recordings and television
. . . . . . . . . 14programs on military activities.
In reflecting on the numerous and diverse activities which we
have just discussed, we may generally conclude that they cannot be
singularly Identified with limited war nor can they be meaningfully
fragmented for that purpose. There are, however, certain activities
which could be so related. In this regard, a rather comprehensive
study titled "Planning and Programming Forces for Stability Operations'
(Classified SECRET) recently completed within the Department of the
Army reflects that the Army Intelligence School, certain MAACs and
missions, and the Inter -American Defense College could be candidates
for such treatment. While the writer believes that the Army





war, he also believes that the study identifies alL of the activities
which could be included in a separate program for that purpose.
PROGRAM VI - RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
All of the Army's research, development, test and evaluation
activities that relate to items which have not been approved for
production and deployment are included in this program. To facilitate
the identification and management of these activities the program is
structured in six categories: Research; Exploratory Developments;
Advanced Developments; Engineering Developments; Management and
Support; and, Operational Systems Development. Within each of
these categories, the activities that are relatively homogeneous
are further integrated into units called "elements". And, the works
to be performed within each element are separately and respectively
identified as projects and tasks. To illustrate this fragmentation,
let us briefly examine the scope of the six basic categories and then
focus our attention on their respective sub-divisions to determine
their singular applicability to limited war.
RESEARCH
The effort in this category is directed to obtaining increased
knowledge of natural phenomena and environment and to solving problems





military application. By definition, all of the Army's basic
research is included in this grouping as we 1 L as that applied
research which is directed toward the expansion of knowledge in
. ..... 16
various sc Lent Lire areas.
EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENTS
The significant characteristic of the effort included in this
grouping is that it is oriented toward specific military problems
with a view to developing and evaluating feasible and practical
solutions short of major development projects.
ADVANCED DEVELOPMENTS
The development of hardware for experimental or operational
tests provides the focus for the effort included in this category.
More specifically, the hardware dealt with in this category has
not yet been designed or engineered for production and deployment.




This grouping includes those development programs for hardware
that is being engineered for service use but which has not been













The activities which support the aircraft, construction,
Laboratories, and test ranges that are required for research and
development use are identified in this final grouping which is
germane to this study. The final grouping in the program structure,
"Operational Systems Development" is a memorandum account to
accumulate cost and other data relating to research efforts included
i_n other programs.
Based upon the above examination there can be little, if any,
doubt that the first and the last two categories are not singularly
related to limited war. However, when we reflect upon the titles
of the elements included in the other three categories which are
reflected in Appendix I, there is evidence that projects peculiar
to limited war could be specifically identified within their scope.
To the extent that such projects are so included, they could be
withdrawn and incorporated into a separate program for limited war.
PROGRAM III - GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
All combat forces of the active Army (other than those in
Program II) and their command and logistical support units are
identified in this program according to the mission or geographical
area to which they are assigned. In this regard, the forces






aggregations - Combatant Forces and Command and Support Forces.
Included in the first aggregation are those forces which are
organized, equipped and trained for the express purpose of conduct-
ing combat or combat support operations. OrdlnarlLy, these units
are assigned to Field Armies, Corps and comparable smaller commands.
The second aggregation Is composed of logistical and support forces
whose missions are to furnish services, to care for the sick and
wounded, to construct and maintain facilities, and to acquire, store,
maintain and Issue or dispose of materiel. Also included in the
second aggregation are administrative and command forces, which support
unified, NATO, and other allied forces and nondefense agencies, and
those which staff a theatre headquarters and its directly related
21
units.
Since the forces included In this program are structured to
deal with any conflict that may occur in the foreseeable future,
including limited war, they vary significantly in size, weaponry,
and mobility among other characteristics.
While it is not practical to identify all of these forces and
to deal specifically with their unique characteristics within the
scope of this study, many of these differences are suggested in
Table 1 which reflects the types of units that are included in the
Genera L Purpose Forces.
In view of the preceding discussion, we may note that the













Provisional Air Mobile Units
Brigades















Army and Corps headquarters units
Armored group headquarters
Armored cavalry regiments













, pp. 2-7, 2-11.
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by type of organization, mission area and military capability makes
it relatively easy for appropriate units to be designated for
inclusion in a separate program for limited war. Likely candidates
for such treatment might be certain air mobility, infantry, and
airborne divisions, combat engineer, signal, and artillery battalions
and units identified as special forces. At this point in the study
we shall not pursue this matter more specifically for we shall do so
when we deal with the research question in Chapter IV. We may con-
clude, however, that the General Purpose Forces Program would
probably require modification if a separate program is established
for limited war. And, we may also concLude that Program III cou Ld
be modified accordingly as required.
SUMMARY
In this chapter we have defined limited war and we have
sharpened the controversy underlying this study by examining all of
the Army programs to determine the extent that they could be mean-
ingfully modified if a separate program is established for limited
war. As a result of this examination we have concluded that Programs
II, IV, and V would not require modification in that they are not
singularly applicable to limited war in any respect. We have also
concluded that Programs III and VI would probably require modifications
in varying degrees, and that little, if any, modif icat ion would have
to be made in Program VII.
To proceed with this study, let us turn to the next chapter
and examine the budget process to determine the probability of




THE COMPETITION FOR FINANCIAL RESOURCES
During discussions with individuals who advocate a separate
program for limited war, the writer was impressed that their serious-
ness of purpose stemmed from a belief that such action would enable
the Army to justify to higher authorities a need for additional
resources. He was also impressed that this belief seemed to stem
from past experiences, such as those relating to Lebanon and Laos,
when resources had to be diverted from other purposes to deal with
the unanticipated requirements generated by these emergencies. In
pursuing these discussions, however, the writer became convinced
that many of these persons possessed limited knowledge of the
budgeting process. In this regard, they indicated a lack of
familiarity with what is involved in translating program estimates
into the President's Budget and in obtaining monies from the Congress
and other higher authorities. Since the writer's experience leads
him to conclude that an understanding of the budgeting process is
essential to determining whether limited war should be programmed
separately, we shall direct our attention to this process and
examine the events that are pertinent to this study.
FOUR FUNDAMENTAL EVENTS
Although the budgeting process involves numerous and detailed
actions on the part of many persons at all levels of command, the
writer's experience has permitted him to conclude that there are
24

four fundamental events at the highest Levels of government which
merit our attention:
L. The identification of estimates in the Five Year
Program;
2. The incLusion of estimates in the President's Budget;
3. The enactment of appropriations by Congress; and,
4. The release of spending authority for executing
approved programs.
ESTIMATES IN THE FIVE YEAR PROGRAM
We have already noted in Chapter 1 that the Five Year Program
is a bridge between military plans and resource allocations in that
it provides a framework for budget estimates to be projected five
years in advance for programs that are approved by the Secretary of
Defense. In order that these estimates may be updated and new
programs may be included to keep pace with changing requirements,
a formal program change control system has been established whereby




Program Change Proposals (PCPs) which are the instruments used
to update the Five Year Program may originate from any source within
the Department of Defense. However, the vast majority of the PCPs
that relate to Army programs are initiated by the Army Staff. To
insure that appropriate action is taken on significant proposals,
25

the Secretary of Defense has directed that PCPs exceeding certain
criteria must be submitted to his office. These criteria are known
as "thresholds", and, in effect, they are upper limits on costs
which cannot be exceeded without his personal approval or approval
by his Deputy.
TYPES OF THRESHOLDS
For all practical purposes, the Secretary's thresholds are
conveniently grouped into three "cost type" categories: (1) Research
and Development; (2) Investment; and, (3) Operating. The "Research
and Development" category includes those costs that are primarily
associated with the development of a new capability to the point
where it is ready for operational use. "Investment" costs are
those costs required beyond the development phase to introduce a new
capability into operational use. "Operating" costs are recurring
2
costs that are required to operate and maintain the new capability.
The current thresholds prescribed by the Secretary are shown in
Table 2.
Within the prescribed limits, the Army is authorized to insti-
tute "Below Threshold" changes to the Five Year Program. However,
as indicated in Table 2, when the change requires resources greater
than the total previously approved, the proposal must be submitted
to the Secretary or his Deputy for appropriate action.
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INITIATION AND ROUTE OF PROGRAM CHANGE PROPOSALS
When proposed changes are forwarded to the Secretary of Defense
for decision, they are prepared on standard forms that require very
detailed information. The scope of these forms and the extensive
instructions relative to their preparation are set forth in Depart-
ment of the Army, Chief of Staff, Regulations 11-2 which are listed
in the bibliography. For the reader's convenience, the type of
essential information included in these forms is shown in Table 3.
After the proposal has been prepared, it must travel a long and
winding route to obtain a decision. For example, when a proposal
is initiated by the Army Staff the route traveled is shown in Table
4. 3
LIKELIHOOD OF PCPS BEING APPROVED
Notwithstanding the time and effort required to prepare and
defend program change proposals, the proportion that are approved
is not favorably impressive. Based upon data for calendar year
1965 provided by the Comptroller of the Army upon the writers
request (the latest available to the writer in preparing this study)
104 Program Change Proposals were prepared by the Army Staff for
review and approval by the Secretary of the Army. Of this total,
only 51 proposals totaling $7,050,700,000 and covering a four year
3 US Dept of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Chief of
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period ware approved by the Secretary ©£ tie Amy fox submission
to tie Secretary of Defense. Althotsgte tMa actios by tie Secre-
tary ©f tie Amy recognised less tisn 50 percent ©£ tie Amy , .
Staff* o stated requirements., tie Secretary of Defense authorised -
only .40 of these proposals to be iaaclasded in whole or in part la -J
tie Five Year Progran. A3 silaom in Table 5 a tie Secretary of . . /
Defense £23 taiing tide action approved ©ssiy $012 SSCO SCCO which is '..
less than 1CS of tie amount recommended by tie Secretary ©£ the
Amy.




noted that much effort is expended in obtaining approval for ;
estimates to be included in tie Five Year Prograa 9 tiere £3 no
guarantee that any estimate reflected in tie Five Year Program
; mil be included in tie President °s IBudget 9 Military requirements
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accurately five years in tie fetaare. Tie programs to which they.,
relate cannet be ranied in saeasaisagful priority until tiey are
considered at a particular point in tine with reference to tie
national economy 9 domestic developments 3 and tie threats ©f tie
international situation* Because ©f tiese and ©tier 'considerations?
tie writer ias frequently observed while serving ©n tie Amy Staff
and in tie Amy Kateriel Command that tie estimates in tie Five
Year Program pertinent to tie budget year under consideration are'
used primarily as guidance ©r wesntro! figures" for developing
tie President's Dudget
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2n this regards tie estimates .for eaeEa
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of the Assy's appropriations <desa:riisd later £a thia chapter) •
which are distributed throughout the Five Yeas Progress a?® re-
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to obccrve is presenting its budget to tie Secretary of Defease-.
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that tie Secretary has historically cade significant reductions
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The reductions made by the Secretary of Defense are net nec-
essarily indicative of the Army's inability to defend its require-
ments. Instead, they are primarily due to the manner in which the
total defense budget is determined. More specifically, during
recent discussions with key personnel within OSD, the writer gained
the distinct impression that the amounts approved for the Army were
based primarily on the force structure authorized the Army. This
authorization is established following the Secretary of Defense's
analysis of Programs I, II and III, in terms of the international
threat and other considerations, and his determination of the total
forces required during the budget year. In this regard, the writer
gained the impression that after the resources required for main-
taining these forces were determined, the funds to be allocated
among the remaining programs which support these forces were
approximated in terms of an order of magnitude, based upon reasoned
judgments as to the relative cost that should be attributed to such
support. In reflecting upon these impressions, the writer believes
that they meaningfully explain why reductions are made in the Army's
estimates and why certain programs have to be eliminated or curtailed
according to their priority in the total defense effort.
ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS BY THE CONGRESS
The reductions made in the Army's estimates by the Secretary
of Defense are usually followed by reductions made by Congress. In
Table 7, the actions taken by Congress on the President's Budget for




CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON ARMY BUDGET




Amounts Allowed by Actual ly
Appropr iat ion House of Rep Senate Appropriated
PEMA
FY 1962 2,564,000 1,991,360 2,543,642 2,532,602
1963 2,555,000 2,500,000 2,555,000 2,520,000
1964 3,202,000 2,958,894 2,931,094 2,931,094
1965 2,081,000 1,958,400 1,958,400 1,958,400
L966 2,035,900 2,018,600 2,017,600 2,017,600
RDT6cE,A
FY 1962 1,205,400 1,202,700 1,203,700 1,203,200
1963 1,329,000 1,317,000 1,323,000 1,319,500
1964 1,469,900 1,363,141 1,391,141 1,386,141
1965 1,397,000 1,340,000 1,340,000 1,340,000
1966 1,464,300 1,432,700 1,432,700 1,432,700
MCA
FY 1962 194,977 147,450 176,512 157,934
1963 234,344 199,478 193,634 181,272
1964 221,164 200,293 207,070 200,646
1965 408,000 311,200 314,000 306,500
1966 448,900 327,200 339,500 330,900
MPA
FY 1962 3,697,000 3,202,000 3,737,000 3,697,000
1963 3,733,000 3,643,300 3,643,300 3,643,300
1964 3,885,000 3,785,000 3,785,000 3,785,000
1965 4,306,000 4,306,000 4,306,000 4,306,000
1966 4,342,600 4,336,000 4,332,300 4,332,300
0&M,A
FY 1962 3,716,000 3,330,460 3,747,710 3,735,710
1963 3,402,000 3,403,345 3,411,845 3,408,345
1964 3,395,200 3,361,000 3,375,643 3,369,071
1965 3,463,000 3,429,000 3,444,000 3,439,000




major appropriations. As wiLL be noted, the Senate usual Ly approves
a greater amount than the House of Representatives; and, after
conference, the amount that is finally appropriated is somewhere
between the two. During discussions with key personnel in the
Office of the Comptroller of the Army the writer Learned that the
increased amount enacted for the 06<M,A appropriation in FY L962
and FY 1963 was used primariLy to finance costs generated by the
Berlin crisis.
Since the appropriations enacted by Congress are structured on
a functional basis which is substantially at variance from the mission
oriented components of the Five Year Program, a brief examination of
each appropriation may be usefuL to the reader.
PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND MISSILES, ARMY (PEMA)
The procurement from private contractors and the production in
government arsenais of major items of combat and support equipment
are financed by the PEMA appropriation. In addition, this appro-
priation finances the acquisition of major parts for supporting the
equipment when it is in use; the industrial facilities necessary to
produce that equipment; and, the major modification of older equip-
ment where such modernization will preclude the procurement of new
items. The materiel categories covered by this appropriation are
aircraft; aircraft replenishment and spare parts; missiles and spare
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parts; weapons and combat vehicles; tactical and support vehicles;
communications and electronic equipment; ammunition; other support
equipment; and production base support.
Although monies are not separately appropriated for each line
item of equipment included in the request for PEMA funds, Congress
reviews the "shopping list" accompanying the request and approves
specific quantities and amounts for each item in determining the
magnitude of monies to be appropriated.
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, ARMY (RDT&E,A)
The Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army appro-
priation provides the principal support of Army activities engaged
in research, exploratory development, and the development of new
weapons and equipment. In addition, the appropriation finances
the procurement of items under development for test and evaluation,
and the operation and maintenance of research laboratories and
testing facilities. The functional categories included in this
appropriation are: military sciences; aircraft, missiles, military
astronautics and their respective related equipment; ships, small
craft, ordnance, combat vehicles and their related equipment; other
equipment; and program-wide management and support.
Army Regulations No. 37-100-66, Financial Administration,





MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, ARMY (MCA)
The acquisition, construction, installation and equipment of
public works, military installations and facilities for the Army
are financed by the MCA appropriation. The functional categories
included in this appropriation are major construction; minor con-
1 f\
struction; planning; and supporting activities.
Like the PEMA and RDT&E,A appropriations, the MCA appropriation
is line item oriented in that each construction project for which
monies are appropriated is specifically identified. Unlike these
two appropriations, however, monies are appropriated for each con-
struction project only after the project has been authorized by
separate Legislation. (Two exceptions need to be made regarding
tills last statement: (L) prior authorization for construction pro-
jects relating to emergencies such as those in Vietnam is not
required; and, (2) prior author izat ion is required for aircraft and
missiles financed by the PEMA appropriation).
MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMY (MPA)
This appropriation finances the pay and allowances of Army
personnel on active duty and of cadets enroLled at West Point and
provides for subsisting en Listed personnel. When Army personne
L
are reassigned, MPA funds pay for their traveL and the travel






storage of their property. MPA funds are also used for paying
expenses incurred in apprehending deserters and escaped military
prisoners, interest on soLdiers deposits; and, death gratuities
to beneficiaries of all Army members.
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY (0&M,A)
The clay -to-day operations of the active Army are financed by
the Operations and Maintenance Appropriation. In addition, this
appropriation provides funds for maintaining and operating facilities
that are used for recruiting, training, administering and supporting
these forces; and for maintaining a mobilization base for emergencies
or war.
While the categories included in the appropriations we have
previously examined combine into a relatively homogenous unit to
achieve a singular objective such as paying personnel, buying
equipment, conducting research or constructing facilities, the
categories in the 0&M,A appropriation are complex and heterogeneous.
An awareness of these unique characteristics is provided by the
language typically used by Congress in specifying the purposes for
1
8
which this appropriation is enacted:
For expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for
the operation and maintenance of the Army, including
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entitled thereto by law or regulation (including charges
of private facilities for care of military personnel
on duty or Leave, except elective private treatment),
and other measures necessary to protect the health of
the Army; care of the dead; chaplain's activities;
awards and medals; welfare and recreation; recruiting
expenses; transportation services; communication
services; maps and similar data for military purposes;
military surveys and engineering planning; contracts
for maintenance of reserve tools and facilities for
twelve months beginning at any time during the current
fiscal year; repair of facilities; hire of passenger
motor vehicles; tuition and fees incident to training
of miLitary personnel at civilian inst itut ions ; fieLd
exercises and maneuvers, including payments in advance
for rentals or options to rent land; expenses for
Reserve Officers Training Corps and other units at
educational institutions, as authorized by law; not
to exceed $4,500,000 for emergencies and extraordinary
expenses, to be expended on the approvaL or authority
of the Secretary of the Army and payments may be made
on his certificate of necessity for confidential mili-
tary purposes and his determination shall be final and
conclusive upon the accounting offices of the govern-
ment, $3,395,200,000 of which not Less than $239,000,000
shaLl be available only for the maintenance of real
property facilities.
Because of the 0&M,A appropriation's Lack of homogeneity,
Congress limits the amounts that may be spent for each category
within this appropriation. As a result, separate amounts are
specified for operating forces; training activities; central supply
activities; major overhaul and maintenance of materiel; medical
activities; and all other Army-wide activities.
THE RELEASE OF SPENDING AUTHORITY FOR EXECUTING APPROVED PROGRAMS
Although approximately one year of continuing effort is devoted
to developing and justifying the Army's financial estimates that
are included in the President's Budget, the Army is required to
update and rejustify its estimates to OSD and the Bureau of the
41

Budged before it is granted authority to spend monies that Congress
appropriates for its use. The actions relating to this requirement
usually commence a short time after the President's Budget is sub-
mitted to Congress in early January; and, they are essentially
completed in the latter part of May when the updated estimates are
rejustified during formal budget hearings. Fundamentally, the
objectives expected to be achieved by these actions are to insure
that maximum benefit is derived from the monies appropriated by
Congress, and that these monies are spent for approved programs
unless there are valid justifications for diverting them to finance
19
other requirements.
NEED FOR REJUSTTFYING BUDGET ESTIMATES20
The need for updating and re justifying the Army's budget
estimates can be placed into perspective by turning our attention
briefly to each appropriation. For the MCA appropriation, there is
relatively little need to reexamine all construction projects before
monies are released (i.e. apportioned) since each project has been
clearly defined and its requirement and expected cost have been well
established by the regular budgetary process. Similarly, unless
there is to be a substantial change in the number of Army personnel
Army Regulations No. 37-15, op. cit. , pp. 2-1, 2-2.
The discussion under this title is based on the writer's
experience on the Army Staff and in the Army Materiel Command during
the period December, 1960 thru June 1965. The discussion also
reflects the consensus of key personnel in the Department of the
Army interviewed by the writer.
42

on duty during the budget year than Lni.ti.aLly predicted, or these
personnel arc to be assigned throughout the worLd s Lgn Lf Leant Ly at
var Lance from earlier p Lans , there is reiativeLy Little need to up-
date and rejustify estimates for the MPA appropriation. For the
PEMA and RDT&E,A appropriations, however, there is a much greater
need because of the nature of the work their monies respectively
f Lnanee
.
More spec if ica L Ly , for the RDT&£,A appropriation, the estLmates
reflected in the President's Budget for individual research and
development projects, and their inc Luded tasks, are at best on Ly
order of magnitude projections that are based upon the best judg-
ment that can be exercised at the time of their development. Since
this judgment must be based upon the state of the art and the status
of each project at that time, the estLmates wLLL have to be changed
if unforeseen problems are encountered or unexpected breakthroughs
are achieved. When either of these unanticipated events occur, a
project may be abLe to be completed on an accelerated basis, or iL
may have to be cancel Led or conducted over a greater period of t Lme
at an excessLve cost. Also, dependLng upon the nature of the pro-
ject, a decision may be made to terminate effort at once because of
political, economic or other considerations.
Like the RDT&E,A appropriation, estimates Lnc Luded Ln the
President's Budget for the numerous weapons and items of materiel
to be fLnanced by the PEMA appropriation are also order of magnitude
and are based on the best judgment whLch can be exercLsed at the
LLme Lhe estLmates are developed. Although precLse quantities and
43

unit costs can often be established for these items, the projected
costs may have to be revised prior to apportionment depending upon
the economic situation that is expected to pertain when procurement
contracts are negotiated with industry. The prescribed quantities
may have to be changed for many reasons. For example, to cite but
a few of these reasons, the requirement for an item may change
because of the international situation, or because of a breakthrough
in technology which will cause the item to become obsolete. Further,
in those instances where PEMA estimates include amounts for items in
the final stage of development that arc expected to be standardized
for procurement during the budget year, the requirement may change
if the item is not standardized as scheduled.
Because of the fact that the 0&M,A appropriation finances a
host of unrelated heterogeneous activities which constitute the
Army's dynamic day-to-day operations, and because the vast majority
of these activities cannot be precisely evaluated in terms of unit
costs and quantities of work, there is little need to elaborate
why the estimates need to be updated and re justified.
Regardless of the Army's effectiveness in justifying its budget
estimates, history indicates that there is zero probability that
the initial amounts released for spending to the Army will be totals
that the Army is ultimately authorized to spend during the budget
year In addition to the reasons cited above, the principal reason
is that higher authorities withhold amounts at the beginning of the
fiscal year which they believe have not been fully justified and
these amounts are later released when appropriate justifications are
44

presented during the budget year or when U Ls necessary to finance
unanticipated high priority requirements.
SUMMARY
In this chapter we have discussed the budgeting process and we
have examined the lour fundamental events in the process that take
place at the highest levels of government. During these examinations,
we have dealt with the procedures Lor including estimates in the
Five Year Program and we have reviewed the manner in which they are
revised during subsequent reviews directed by the Secretary of
Defense, Congress, and the Director of the Budget* We have also
discussed the £ ive major appropriations which finance the active
Army. Of particular significance, one fact is readiLy apparent
from the data in Tables Number 6 and 7 -- even though estimates for
a separate program may be included in the Five Year Program, there
is no assurance that those estimates will actually result in funds
being provided to the Army. While, indeed, there may be no arbi-
trary budget ceilings, there most certainly is a limit on the
amounts that may be spent for defense. As stated by Mr. Hitch
while he was serving as Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller:
. . .
when I say we have eliminated the use of arbitrary
budget ceiling in formulating the defense budget, I do
not mean to imply that there are no constraints whatsoever
on the size of the Defense Budget at any particular time
and under any particular set of circumstances. Certainly,
if the international situation worsens, the value of an
additional increment would be relatively greater than
before in reLation to the other needs and concerns of the
United States Government. But all too many people interpret
45

'no arbitrary budget ceilings' to mean no limits on
resources, and this can never be - in peace or in war,
here or abroad.
Let us turn at this time to the next chapter, where we shaLl
deal specifically with the programming controversy and the question
for research.
2 IOperations Research , Plans, Programs and Budgets in the




ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAMMING CONTROVERSY
As stated earlier in this study, the proponents of a separate
program for limited war believe that the program will assist the
Army in obtaining greater resources for carrying out its mission.
Further, they believe that it will preclude resources from being
diverted from approved programs to cope with emergencies as they
have in the past. To deal with these contentions, let us raise
four basic questions:
1. What forces are required for limited war?;
2. Should forces be identified solely for limited war?;
3. To what extent should current programs be modified?;
and
,
4. What is the probability of additional resources being
made available to the Army?
WHAT FORCES ARE REQUIRED FOR LIMITED WAR?
Irrespective of whether the spectrum of limited war is defined
as set forth in the preceding chapter or is limited to conflicts of
lower intensity, the answer to this basic question provides the
catalyst essential to establishing a separate program for limited
war. Until these forces are determined there is no meaningful basis
for modifying current programs or for recommending that the Army be
provided with additional resources.
47

To be sure, there are many variables and uncertainties that
must be evaluated in making this determination. To mention but a
few, we may cite the nature of the threats in various parts of
the world as they relate to our national objectives and strategy;
the capabilities of unfriendly nations to pursue insurgency and
limited war type aggression; and the climate, terrain, and other
geographical factors that are peculiar to each area involved. We
may also cite the types of weapons and logistical support that would
be required by Army forces in each area; for, most likely, they
would be different. In this regard, we need only to refer to the
helicopters that have had such an important role in Korea and
Vietnam. These aircraft would be relatively useless in a conflict
where the enemy enjoys a competent air capability or anti-aircraft
defense
.
In general, adequate intelligence data are available for deal-
ing with the preceding. And, indeed, they are used in determining
the composition of the General Purpose Forces identified in Program
III whose missions include but are not restricted to limited war.
Nevertheless, these data cannot be meaningfully employed for deter-
mining the forces required solely for limited war until the boundary
between limited war and general war is specifically defined. The
point is significant, for if separate forces are to be programmed
for limited war and justified accordingly, there needs to be a basis
for determining when a conflict escalates to general war so that




During recent discussions with key personnel at the decision-
making level within the Department of the Army, the writer learned
that this boundary had not been defined. And, he gained the
impression that a meaningful definition would probably not be forth-
coming in the near future. Without this definition there is no
basis for answering the basic question we have just discussed; and,
no useful purpose would be served by examining the different types
of forces previously used in dealing with emergencies of varying
magnitudes and duration. To continue this study, however, we shall
assume that, in time, the forces required solely for limited war can
probably be determined; and, we shall proceed to the next question.
SHOULD FORCES BE IDENTIFIED SOLELY FOR LIMITED WAR ?
An affirmative response to this question would be made by those
individuals who advocate such a program. For they contend that this
identification would reflect to higher authorities the magnitude of
forces engaged in particular conflicts and the resources required
for their support. While the objectives to be achieved by this
contention are meritorious, questions may be raised as to whether
a separate program is the only way limited war requirements can be
placed in focus, and whether the Army can afford to pay the price
for this convenience.
By recognizing the marvels of modern communications and the
civilian constraints upon the military services, there is no need
to dwell on the ability of the Army and higher authorities to be
informed regarding forces involved in any conflict. By further
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recognizing that the increased costs generated by all past
emergencies have been identified by means of the reporting pre-
scribed by the Army's "Financial Plan for Emergency Conditions"
and other pertinent directives, there is every reason to believe
that similar costs can be accumulated in the future. At present,
persons with OSD and the Department of the Army who require this
information indicate that pertinent data regarding Vietnam are
being accumulated to their satisfaction. Whether these data will
generate approval for additional resources is a matter for con-
jecture. However, we shall consider the probability of additional
resources being provided when we examine the final question.
Of more fundamental importance in considering whether forces
should be identified solely for limited war are the risks the Army
would face as a result of such action. In Chapter 2 we noted that
the Army's General Purpose Forces provide capabilities for responding
to wars of varying intensity and that certain of these forces would
be the principal candidates for inclusion in a separate program for
limited war. As long as all of these forces remain in Program III
they can be employed as appropriate to meet any situation. Once
any of the forces are identified solely for limited war, however,
their use is technically restricted and the Army loses flexibility
in responding to emergencies.
Since higher authorities can be expected to authorize future
Army forces based upon factors that are essentially the same as
those now considered, it is unlikely that a separate program for
limited war would enable the Army to obtain a greater authorization.
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On the contrary, if separate forces are designated for limited war,
they are Likely to be evaluated more critically by higher authorities
than they would be if they remained in Program III. This likelihood
is very real due to the difficulty involved in defining the threat
of limited wars and the probability that they will occur. Thus,
there is a risk that these evaluations could result in reductions
in Army forces if conclusions were reached that the numbers designated
for limited war were overstated. Even if these reductions are not
made, however, the consequences of not accurately determining the
forces to be used solely for limited war are readily apparent. If
too many forces are identified, some would have to be used to deal
with other threats. If too few are identified, they would have to
be augmented by the forces remaining in Program III.
These consequences are not necessarily serious since forces in
any program are available for other purposes if required. However,
in view of the time consuming effort required to make program adjust-
ments which we noted in Chapter 3, the consequences would burden the
Army with needless administration in making program adjustments if
forces are identified solely for limited war.
TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD CURRENT PROGRAMS BE MODIFIED?
If a separate program is established for Limited War, our
analysis in Chapter 2 indicates that certain forces currently
identified in Program III - General Purpose Forces and in Program
VII - General Support are the principal candidates to be included.
Also, our analysis indicates that certain projects which are oriented
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primarily to limited war in Program VI - Research and Development
could be accorded similar treatment. For all other programs, we
were able to establish that they should remain unchanged.
In view of our previous discussions, we may conclude that
Programs III and VII should be modified to delete forces that are
selected for the separate program. However, because of the fact
that Program VI in the "Five Year Program" includes all of the
research and development activities of the Army as well as those
of the other services, the writer believes that the identification
of certain Army projects with a separate program for limited war
has little merit.
During recent discussions with individuals charged with managing
over ninety percent of the Army's research effort, the writer
established to his satisfaction that relatively few (probably less
than five percent) of the total projects managed are peculiar only
to limited war. However, he also established to his satisfaction
that there is no general agreement on the projects that should merit
this distinction because of the requirements being generated in
Vietnam. In this regard, projects not previously considered peculiar
to limited war are being modified to deal with specific problems
pertinent to this conflict.
In view of the preceding and the general complexity of research
and development activities which we previously discussed, the writer
believes that Program VI should continue to be managed as it is at
present; and, that it should not be modified to identify specific
projects with a separate program for limited war.
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WHAT IS THE PROBABILITY OF ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE ARMY?
As indicated in Chapter 3 and more specifically in Table 7,
the resources appropriated for the Army during Fiscal Years 1962
thru 1964 remained essentially the same in all appropriations.
During the past two years, although there have been significant
increases in three appropriations, the total appropriated has been
a lesser amount. To be sure, there are pertinent reasons to explain
the changes such as pay raises for military and civilian personnel,
reduced procurements of missiles and sophisticated weaponry, and
the increased construction and operational costs associated with
Vietnam. However, when one reflects upon the reductions that have-
been made in the Army's estimates (Tables 5 and 6), it is apparent
that the Army's stated requirements exceed the amounts that will be
made available within current budget limitations. To support this
observation, we may note in Table 8 that the total spending
authority for national defense has approximated $50 billion per
year since 1962.
In view of the preceding discussion, we may reasonably conclude
that the Army will not be provided additional resources unless
additional forces are authorized or there is a significant escalation
in current hostilities. Since a separate program for limited war
is unlikely to justify an increase in Army forces for reasons






NEW SPENDING AUTHORIZED FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE
, ($ in Billions)
. Fiscal Years
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Major Military Programs Actual Actual Actual Estimate Es tima te
Strategic Retaliatory Forces $ 9.0 $ 8.4 $ 7.3 $ 5.3 $ 4.5
Continental Air & Missile
Defense Forces 2.1 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.8
General Purpose Forces 17.6 17.8 17.7 18.1 19.0
Airlift and Sealift Forces 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.6
Reserve Forces 1.8 1.8 2.0 , 2.1 2.0
Research & Development
(not included elsewhere) 4.3 5.1 5.3 5.1 5.4
General Support 12.9 13.1 13.6 14.3 14.6
Retired Pay 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5
Total Obligational Avail 48.9 50.5 50.6 49.6 50.5
of which:
New Spending Authority 47.9 49.4 49.9 48.6 47.4
Prior Year Fund 1.0 1.1 .7 1.0 3.1
budget FY 66 DOD Extract p. 57
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Before we respond to the research question based on the answer
to the previous questions, let us deal briefly with the concern
expressed by individuals regarding the need for resources to be
diverted to support emergencies.
FINANCING EMERGENCIES
Although emergencies may generate costs that have not been
provided for, these costs are likely to be small except for those
relating to daily operations. To explain this statement let us
refer to the major appropriations we examined in Chapter 3.
Since the Military Personnel, Army appropriation provides for
the pay and allowances of all active duty personnel, additional funds
are not required when emergencies occur unless there is an increase
in Army forces. However, since this appropriation also pays for
moving personnel to overseas areas and to permanent assignments
within the United States, additional funds are required when emer-
gencies generate costs in excess of those normally incurred.
While emergencies often generate construction requirements
which have not been provided for by the Military Construction, Army
appropriation, there is little opportunity for funds to be diverted
from approved projects. As we noted in Chapter 3, construction
projects routinely require prior approval by the Congress before
funds are appropriated for each project. Since most construction
is accomplished by civilian firms, there is little opportunity to
divert funds once they have been cited on contracts. In those
instances when funds can be diverted and such action is taken,
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Congress must be specifically advised of all the circumstances
involved.
Since emergencies of short duration do not ordinarily provide
a need for new research or the acceleration of action on approved
projects, there are usually no additional requirements for RDT&E,A
funds. For emergencies of prolonged duration which cause research
to be initiated or accelerated to develop or modify materiel, for
example, low priority projects may be curtailed or eliminated if
funds are not otherwise available.
With regard to the PEMA appropriation, emergencies do not
usually generate requirements for hardware which can be procured
for immediate delivery. Because of the high cost of hardware items
and the production time involved, requirements generated by emer-
gencies are usually financed by supplemental appropriations if they
cannot be deferred for the next annual budget.
Unlike the preceding appropriations, the 0&M,A appropriation
finances activities where costs are significantly increased when
emergencies occur. This difference stems from the fact that its
funds are used primarily to pay civilian personnel, to purchase
supplies and equipment, and to cover transportation charges. During
emergencies, there are increased requirements for all of these
factors; and, costs are financed to the maximum possible extent by
diverting funds from lowest priority projects such as the maintenance
of facilities.
The extent to which available resources within any appropriation
are to be used to finance emergencies is largely determined by the
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Secretary of Defense. If, in his judgment, these resources should
not be used, he may request Congress to enact supplemental appro-
priations or he may employ specific authorities that Congress has
granted him for dealing with emergencies. In this regard, the
nrnvi q i nn o r\P (-lio "lion t v l-mop t- (if T\a Fpncp Annt-Qn*"i:>t~l<">ri A/->*- 1 QAA "
permit the Secretary to incur costs prior to funds being appropriated
2for airborne alerts or for supporting increases in military personnel.
In addition, this act authorizes the Secretary to transfer funds
between appropriations up to $200,000,000, ". . . if he deems it
vital to the security of the United States and in the national
3
interest to further improve the readiness of the Armed Forces. ..."
In view of the manner the Secretary carefully evaluates mili-
tary requirements in developing the President's Budget, which we
examined in Chapter 3, there is reason to believe that he exercises
similar judgment in considering the impacts of emergencies before he
pursues any of the alternatives cited in the preceding paragraph.
During the Berlin crisis, however, the Secretary requested supple-
mental appropriations to finance costs that could not be absorbed
within available resources. He also used his authority to incur
costs, prior to monies being appropriated, for the additional forces














that were brought on active duty. During the Cuban emergency,
the Secretary transferred funds among appropriations to finance
the increased costs of day-to-day operations and to support military
personnel. In the final months of the past fiscal year, supple-
mental appropriations were obtained for financing the escalation in
Vietnam.
When consideration is given to the authorities available to
the Secretary of Defense for dealing with emergencies, and to the
extent they have been used in the past, there is sufficient evidence
to conclude that future emergencies will be financed accordingly.
There is also sufficient evidence to conclude that a separate pro-
gram for limited war would not change this situation. With this
observation, let us now answer the question for research.
SHOULD LIMITED WAR BE PROGRAMMED SEPARATELY?
In answering the questions presented at the beginning of this
chapter, and in examining how emergencies are likely to be financed
in the future, we have reached several conclusions that are signif-
icant for dealing with the question for research:
1. There is no meaningful basis for defining the parameters
of limited war or for determing the forces required for its pursuit;
Writer's discussions with key personnel at the decisionmaking
level within the Office, Secretary of Defense, 10 Dec. 1965.
6 Ibid.
Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriation , Public Law
89-18, 7 May 1965.
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2. If separate forces are designated for. limited war, there
is a risk that their more critical evaluation by higher authorities
could result in army forces being reduced since the threat of limited
wars is hard to define and it is difficult to predict the probability,
of there occurrence.
3. The designation of separate forces for limited war
technically restricts their use and impairs the Army's flexibility
in responding to other threats;
4. The difficulty in distinguishing accurately between
forces required for limited war and those required for general
purposes will probably result in time consuming adjustments being
made in their respective programs which will place an unnecessary
burden on the Army; and,
5. The resources made available to the Army are not. likely
to be increased just because a separate program is established for
limited war because their magnitude is determined principally by
economic, political and other considerations examined in Chapter 3.
Since it is evident from these conclusions that the Army would
not benefit by a separate program for limited war, we shall answer
the research question by responding in the negative. In taking this
position, the writer believes that should it be necessary to focus
attention on limited war requirements, this objective can be achieved
by specifically identifying pertinent activities within the spectrum
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